My Airport Operations

From Reactive to Proactive: the future of aviation security




The recent paradigm shift by terrorists from targeting passenger aircraft to cargo and freight airlines is hardly unexpected. As usual, the industry has responded with a media blitz of 'shock and awe', while pundits and 'experts' call for a complete overhaul of existing aviation security measures to 'deal with this new diabolical threat'.

Standards and practices for commercial airlines of 100% cargo screening – developed in response to the threat of explosives placed in checked bags – may be a reality, although stretching the limits of both technology and human endurance, but unfortunately is far from becoming a reality when it comes to dealing with the hundreds of thousands of pallets of containerized boxes, crates and barrels transited around the globe each day.

What is dysfunctional here is not the screening technology, nor even the goal of 100% screening for cargo and mail. What is fundamentally skewed however, is the perception among the aviation industry's security and law enforcement community as a whole, of being reactive, rather than proactive in their thinking, planning, training and execution of aviation security policy and practices.

As terrorists evolved their strategies from simple hijacking (which posed logistical issues of what to do with the hostages once you commandeer the aircraft) to improvised explosive devices (found to be too easily discovered at security checkpoints) on to more sophisticated (albeit failed devices such as the shoe bomb, the underwear bomb and who knows what else was tried, tested and failed leading to the senseless deaths of countless test bombers throughout the caves of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen) and now to highly sophisticated IED's using bootlegged PETN and common office items.

There exists within the industry today, a fatal combination of:

1. Traditional Reactive perceptions in policy making

2. A hopelessly muddled bureaucracy at the key levels of policy implementation

3. A lack of commitment on the part of top organizational decision makers as to the need for proper security personnel training, ongoing testing and periodic evaluation of the corporate security structure as a whole

4. A near malfeasance in allocating appropriate funding to security training

5. A failure to undertake the modeling of possible future scenarios, and utilizing the results as input to current policy and procedural decision making

Simply recognizing the current reactive nature of aviation security and acknowledging a need for change is a significant step for most. To approach aviation security from a truly proactive standpoint requires an in-depth understanding of:

• the threat as well as its capabilities and mindset

• the history of each individual threat typology

• technologies available to the would be terrorist, criminal or sociopath

• existing interdictive technologies and their correct application/operation

• current advances in scientific and academic disciplines which might contribute to enhancing the skills of security personnel, flight crews and cabin crews in their ability to identify, report and interdict threats PRIOR to an incident occurrence


Moving Forward

The concept of Proactive Interdiction requires taking a Systems Approach to aviation security. In other words, view each element of the system as an interrelated and interdependent part of the larger whole. In today's global world, this philosophy translates into an array of interconnected elements (airlines, airports, CAA and municipal agencies), working together throughout the globe on a daily basis.

The process begins with inputting a "snapshot" of the security status of an organization as it exists today. This in fact, is the purpose of the AVSEC (Security) Audit. For airports, the audit should, as a minimum, follow the requirements as set forth in ICAO Annex 17, and Amendments 10-11, Annex 18 and Documents 8973 Security Manual, as well as Doc 9137 Part 7 Emergency Planning. For airlines, use of the IOSA Audit Checklists 6: Ground Handling and Checklist 8: Security proves most useful in evaluating current security procedures. A review of US 49 CFR Part 1544 and the individual airline's own Quality Assurance Program, a comprehensive security operational baseline can easily be established.

With the appropriate data gathered, the next step towards developing a truly proactive security program is in conducting the organizational audit data analysis. During this phase, as a minimum, information collected from the various audit instruments (checklists) is examined with respect to:

a. compliance with ICAO, IATA and National AVSEC Standards

b. policy and procedures at the organizational level are examined in detail for their ability to address both present and "most likely' future threats

c. organizational procedures are compared to individual station requirements (station contingency plans should reflect the provisions found in the local airport security and emergency plans)

d. the individual contingency plan's ability to translate input from outside sources to activities to be undertaken during times of enhanced security levels

e. integration with the various Air Operator Security Plans and the security plan of each individual airport within the "systems network"

f. establishment of provisions for the integration of information developed from open channels of communication, information and intelligence from local government and global industry sources

g. personnel training needs, knowledge requirements and technical skills abilities

Whether airport or airline, administrators should not overlook the importance of feedback from both line and staff personnel in offices, on the AOA or on the Flight Deck, in developing new and innovative policies and procedures. What may appear effective on paper, at times is either impractical or impossible based on the 'real world' working environment. An excellent case in point is the issue of 100% cargo screening at airports worldwide.

For most organizations, translating the results of the Needs Analysis into an action plan for most organizations will require a degree of revision to existing operational policies and procedures. For air operators, security manuals, flight manuals, Quality Assurance Programs and individual station contingency plans, all must reflect revised procedures specifically designed to address both existing and projected threats to the specific aviation operation at hand.

Once in place, the new alerting, reporting and responding procedures must be thoroughly tested, and, utilizing the feedback this testing provides, revised before a final effective set of procedures can be developed.


Conclusion

As terror organizations continue to evolve and refine their strategies and tactics in response to ever tightening security measures by the aviation industry. Airports, airlines and concerned government agencies must now work cooperatively to develop proactive strategies and implement security measures which anticipate as well as respond to a wide variety of potential threat situations.